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new doctrine like to believe, however remote the possibility of realization, that
their candidates will shortly sweep into the seats of political power, and the
promise of such an event is an effective means of gaining support. And finally, of
course, there is always the possibility of the minor party actually replacing one
of the major parties, a possibility which, though remote, should not be ignored.
THE GROWTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL SHOE DOCTRINE
When residents of one state carry on business in another state through their
agents, the courts of the latter state cannot acquire jurisdiction in personam
over the nonresidents under the historical prerequisite of the presence of the
defendant., Yet common ideas of justice may require that the nonresidents be
subject to suit in the courts of the state in which they are doing business. Until
recently, the principal's absence from the state was thought to deny its courts
any power over him, if he were an individual. When the principal was a juristic
person further complexities appeared, 2 but the courts found it easier to develop
jurisdictional doctrines to meet the situation. Thus, under some circumstances,
the foreign corporation may be denied the privilege of doing business in the
state unless it has designated an agent in the state upon whom service of process
may be made. In the absence of such express consent by the corporation to the
exercise of jurisdiction,3 proper service of process 4 may nevertheless give a court
jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against the corporation. This power
has been based upon various concepts, the courts most often referring to the
"implied consent" of the corporation to the exercise of jurisdictions or to the
"presence" of the corporation wherever its activities are being carried on.6 The
x Unless, of course, the nonresident, if an individual, happens into the state at an oppor-
tune moment.
2Early in the nineteenth century it was thought impossible to acquire jurisdiction in
personam over a foreign corporation. Middlebrooks v. Springfield Fire Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 3oi
(1841); Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law 77
et seq. (i918).
3 When the corporation has expressly consented to jurisdiction over it, the extent of the
authority thereby conferred is a question of interpretation of the instrument of consent or of
the statute requiring it. Thus, the authorization of the agent to accept service of process may
include causes of action arising in other states. Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue
Mining and Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (i9I 7); Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron
Co., 222 Fed. 148 (D.C. N.Y., 1915). Or it may be construed to refer only to causes of action
arising out of business done in the state. Dunn v. Cedar Rapids Engineering Co., 152 F. 2d
733 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945). Cases involving express consent are not considered in this note.
4 Of course, a judgment against a foreign corporation, or any other defendant, is void
unless the method of service employed is reasonably calculated to give notice to the defendant
and to afford it an opportunity to be heard. Rest., Judgments §§ 6, 3o (1942); 1 Beale, Conflict
of Laws § 89. 3 (1935). This note is concerned with the other element of jurisdiction-the
power of a state to subject a person to its control.
s Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. (U.S.) 404 (1855); Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
6 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Philadelphia & Reading
Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Bank of America v. Whitney Cent. Nat. Bank, 261
U.S. 171 (1923).
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fictional character of both these theories, as well as their inadequacy to explain
the decisions, has been demonstrated.7 Under either appoach, the extent of the
activities of the foreign corporation within the state of the forum is of major
significance. This is recognized by the courts in the phrase "doing business,"
which not only expresses a conclusion of fact but also denotes the result of a
policy judgment. 8
The fictions were at last expressly discarded by the Supreme Court in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, Chief justice Stone asserting:
To say that a corporation is so far "present" there as to satisfy due process re-
quirements ... is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms "present" or
"presence" are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent
within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due
process.... Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with
the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there. An "estimate of the inconveniences" which would result to the corporation from
a trial away from its "home" or principal place of business is relevant in this connec-
tion.9
Thus, jurisdiction in personam was constitutionally acquired over the defendant
corporation because its operations had established "sufficient contacts or ties
with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to our tradi-
tional conception of fair play and substantial justice"' to subject it to suit
there. This new test of reasonableness and justice involves a balancing of con-
flicting interests in a manner not unlike the determination of a forum non con-
veniens question,", Although it may be no less vague and uncertain than the
7 "Implied consent": L. Hand, J., in Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron Co.,
222 Fed. 148 (D.C. N.Y., 1g1s); 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 89.7 (1935); Henderson, op. cit.
supra note x, at 87-96. "Presence": Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 73, at x75-76 (1938); Beale,
supra, at § 89.6; Farrier, jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 270, 28o-8i,(1933).
8 Thus, though it may be an admitted fact that the corporation is transacting a certain
amount of business in the state, the courts often say that the corporation is "not doing busi-
ness" in the state. Such a statement means that the court believes the corporation's activities
are not so extensive as to make it reasonable to require it to defend or suffer judgment by
default.
9 326 U.S. 3io, 3i6-17 (1945). As to "implied consent": "True, some of the decisions holding
the corporation amenable to suit have been supported by resort to the legal fiction that it has
given its consent to service and suit, consent being implied from its presence in the state
through the acts of its authorized agents.... But more realistically it may be said that those
authorized acts were of such a nature as to justify the fiction." Ibid., at 318.
io Ibid., at 320.
"1 In the opinion of judge Learned Hand, the case holds that in order to determine juris-
diction "the court must balance the conflicting interests involved; i.e., whether the gain to the
plaintiff in retaining the action where it was, outweighed the burden imposed upon the de-
fendant; or vice versa. That question is certainly indistinguishable from theissue of 'forum non
conveniens.'" Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F. 2d 788 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948), cert. den.,
69 S. Ct. 32 (1948). The reasoning of the Court in the International Shoe case relies consider-
ably on that of judge Hand in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F. 2d 139 (C.CA. 2d, 193o).
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"presence" theory,2 it does place the determination of jurisdiction on a more
realistic basis. Moreover, the opinion supplements the broad general test with
two further questions: whether the activities of the foreign corporation within
the state have been continuous and systematic or only single or isolated acts,
and whether or not the activities gave rise to the liabilities sued on.
I
Both the broad test stated in the International Shoe case and its general lan-
guage seem clearly to imply that courts may constitutionally exercise greater
freedom than they might have formerly in subjecting foreign corporations to in
personam actions.'3 It may be interesting to examine subsequent cases in the
state and lower federal courts in an effort to learn to what extent the potentiali-
ties of that case have been realized.'4 As might be expected, application of the
standards of the International Shoe case has been objected to on the ground that
they apply only to matters of special state regulation and not to general juris-
dictional questions. This view has been generally rejected, 5 and is without sup-
port in the case itself. The Court expressly dealt with two questions, jurisdiction
for purposes of suit and jurisdiction to tax, but the opinion was chiefly con-
cerned with the former. Nor did the language of the Court in any way suggest
that the authority of its holding was to be limited to actions brought by a state
to recover unemployment compensation contributions.
It seems clear that one result ofthe International Shoe case is to require less
corporate activity within the state than was required in the past as a basis for
asserting jurisdiction. In other words, a given quantity and quality of activities
may now be held to constitute "doing business" for purposes of subjection to
suit, 6 although such activities would not formerly have amounted to "doing
2 See McBaine, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations: Actions Arising out of Acts Done
within the Forum, 34 Calif. L. Rev. 331, 336 (1946), criticizing the case on this ground.
X3 It is, in a sense, true that the Court "engaged in an unnecessary discussion in the course
of which it... announced... Constitutional criteria applied for the first time... ," as
Justice Black stated in his concurring opinion. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 323 (1945). Since the same result could have been reached by a slight advance in
the application of prior doctrines, the tests stated might be considered dicta. But, for the
same reason, it appears that the majority of the Court felt very strongly about the need for
new criteria in jurisdictional matters, and it seems reasonable to believe that the Court will hold
to the doctrines of the case for some time to come. Any change would most likely be a further
extension.
14 Although the decisions as to jurisdiction over foreign corporations depend in the first
instance upon the construction of statutes providing for service of process, this statutory inter-
pretation is usually keyed to constitutional interpretation. Thus, an extension of constitu-
tional power may be reflected in the cases without the enactment of new legislation.
IS Wooster v. Trimont Mfg. Co., 356 Mo. 682, 203 S.W. 2d 411 (1947); State v. Ford
Motor Co., 208 S.C. 379, 38 S.E. 2d 242 (1946). Contra: Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc.,
68 F. Supp. 156 (N.Y., 1946), rev'd 165 F. 2d 33 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948); Murray v. Great Northern
Ry. Co., 67 F. Supp. 944 (Pa., 1946).
16 What constitutes "doing business" by a foreign corporation may be important for at
least three purposes: r) to determine jurisdiction for service of process (which is the only
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business." The Court has apparently done away with the "mere solicitation
rule" which had become attached to the concept of "doing business.'7 One
frequently recurring "mere solicitation" fact situation is that of the foreign rail-
road corporation, engaged in soliciting freight and passenger business. The facts
in a New York federal district court case 8 are typical: The defendant corpora-
tion maintained a New York office, where eight persons were employed, for the
sole purpose of solicitation of freight and passenger business. No bills of lading
were issued at this office, no settlements of claims made, and no tickets sold, since
the railroad had no tracks in New York and its customers there consequently
bought their tickets from lines which connected with the defendant's. It was
also found that various New York trust companies acted as registrars, trustees,
stock transfer agents, and interest disbursing agents of the corporation's se-
curity issues. The district court applied the "mere olicitation rule,"'i without
referring to the International Shoe case, and granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss,'0 since the defendant was not "doing business" within the district."
This decision was reversed in the circuit court," Judge Learned Hand stating:
aspect of the concept considered here); 2) to determine jurisdiction to tax; 3) to determine
whether or not the corporation must "domesticate." Rest., Conflict of Laws § x67 (1934);
Roberts, What Constitutes "Doing Business" by a Foreign Corporation in Kentucky, 3x Ky.
L. J. 3 (1942). The content of the concept varies according to its use; "doing business" for
one purpose may not be "doing business" for another purpose. State v. Ford Motor Co.,
208 S.C. 379, 38 S.E. 2d 242 (1946) (corporation held subject to jurisdiction for service of
process but not subject to domestication requirements).
"7 The "rule"-that solicitation alone, without other activities on the part of the agents
within the state, was not "doing business"-perhaps originated in Green v. Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). Although the Court in International Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914), called the Green case "extreme," it went on to find that
"[i]n the case now under consideration there was sonething more than mere solicitation."
is Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 72 F. Supp. 635 (N.Y., 1947).
'9 "It will be enough to refer to the leading case of Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 205
U.S. 530 ... which has... never been overruled, either expressly or impliedly .... " Ibid.,
at 638. Accord: Murray v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 67 F. Supp. 944 (Pa., i946).
"0 Several courts, relying on the International Shoe case, have reached the opposite result
on comparable facts. Lasky v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 157 F. 2d 674 (C.C.A. 6th, 1946);
Willhtt v. Union Pacific R. Co., 76 F. Supp. 903 (Ohio, 1948); Butts v. Southern Pac. Co.,
69 F. Supp. 895 (N.Y., 1947); Nunn v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. Co., 7r F. Supp. 541
(N.Y., 1947) (following the Butts case); cf. Vincent v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 73 F. Supp. 729
(N.Y., 1947) (same result without reference to the International Shoe case).
" The action was for damages for personal injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, for which the venue provision reads: "Under this chapter an action may be brought in a
district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which
the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of
commencing such action .... " 35 Stat. 66 (igoS), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. § 56 (i943). The
extent of activities which equals "doing busines!s" under this statute is apparently the same as
that which is necessary to make the foreign corporation amenable to suit in other cases.
Precedents in the two types of cases are used interchangeably. Cases cited note 20 supra.
- Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., i66 F. 2d 788 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948), cert. den. 69 S. Ct. 32
(1948).
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[S]o far as it [the foreign corporation] must be "present" in order to satisfy the
territorial limitation upon the powers of a court when acting in personam, it should be
enough constitutionally that it shall have extended its activities into the territory
where that court's process runs. If that is true, the question whether it must stand
trial in the particular forum which the plaintiff has chosen is... identical with the
plea of "forum non conveniens. '23
This is the effect of the International Shoe case. Consequently, since the de-
fendant in this instance was not aided by forum non conveniens principles,4 its
motion to dismiss should have been denied, in the opinion of the circuit court.
It may be noted that the corporation here did something slightly more than
merely solicit orders. It should be pointed out, however, that it is difficult to
imagine a case in which a court could not find that the corporation engaged in
something more than "mere"_" solicitation2 5 The form of the rule is of little im-
portance if the rule has no substance. Since the International Shoe case, the sub-
stance is gone, and the form is fast disappearing. Continuous solicitation of busi-
ness may alone be sufficient activity to make the foreign corporation subject to
the personal jurisdiction of a court of the state where the solicitation is done,
at least so long as the cause of action is one arising out of the business done, since
the court would then normally be the forum of convenience for the action.2
6
23 Ibid., at 791.
24 Although the case involved a foreign cause of action, the defendant could not be aided by
forum non conveniens principles because, in actions under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, the venue provision of that Act (note 21 supra) had been construed to give the plaintiff
a choice of forum which could not be defeated on the basis of forum non conveniens. Baltimore
& Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941); Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698
(1942); cf. United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948) (similar doctrine in civil
suits to enjoin violations of Sherman Act). The Kepner doctrine has, however, been abrogated
by the new Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C.A. § x4o4(a) (1948). Forum non conveniens has since been
applied in actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Nunn v. Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. P. & P. R. Co., go F. Supp. 745 (N.Y., 1948); Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 79
F. Supp. 821 (Minn., 1948); cf. United States v. National City Lines, 8o F. Supp. 734 (Cal.,
1948) (suit for injunction under Sherman Act). Ordinarily, the fact that the cause of action
did not arise out of business done within the state would be significant, if not decisive, as to
jurisdiction over the foreign corporation. This should not detract from the significance of the
Kilpatrick decision as to the extent of activities necessary for jurisdiction in all cases.
2sIn the following cases, the defendants' activities were held to be more than "mere solicita-
tion": Marlow v. Hinman Mfilking Mach. Co., 7 F.R.D. 751 (Minn., 1947) (agents advised
dealers and sometimes "even performed minor repairs" on machines); State v. Ford Motor
Co., 208 S.C. 379, 38 S.E. 2d 242 (1946) (control over automobile dealers through contracts);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 22 Wash. 2d 146, 154 P. 2d Sor (i945) (salesmen
sometimes rented sample rooms).
26 In situations involving foreign corporations other than railroads, the activities of the
corporate agents being mainly, if not entirely, solicitation, the defendants were held subject
to jurisdiction in the following cases, the courts expressly following the International Shoe
case: Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., I65 F. 2d 33 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948), (reversing lower court
which had followed "mere solicitation" rule); Schmikler v. Petersime Incubator Co., 77 F.
Supp. ii (Mass., 1948); Marlow v. Hinman Milking Mach. Co., 7 F.R.D. 751 (Minn., 1947);
Wooster v. Trimont Mfg. Co., 356 Mo. 682, 203 S.W. 2d 411 (i947); State v. Ford Motor
Co., 208 S.C. 379, 38 S.E. 2d 242 (946). One court thought the International Shoe decision
upheld the "mere solicitation" rule, but the corporation's local agent had engaged in so many
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Ample authority may be found in the International Shoe case for this proposi-
tion.27
Illustrative of the changes in ways of transacting business which require cor-
responding changes in jurisdictional doctrines is the case of the mail order in-
surer. In a case'S involving the South Carolina Uniform Unauthorized Insurers
Act,29 the defendant Illinois corporation, which had no office, property, or agents
within South Carolina, had insured the plaintiff's husband by mail, after his
inquiry responding to the insurer's advertisement in a national publication.
The plaintiff beneficiary, seeking to recover on the policy in a federal district
court, was met with jurisdictional objections. The Act provides:
The transacting of business in this state by a foreign or alien insurer without being
authorized to do business in this state and the issuance or delivery by such foreign or
alien insurer of a policy ... to a citizen of this state or to a resident thereof ... is
equivalent to an appointment by such insurer of the Commissioner of Insurance
[as agent for service of process] in any action.., arising out of such policy.3o
Relying considerably on the International Shoe case, the court found that the
primary purpose of the statute was to afford the parties judicial facility for
settling disputes "according to our traditional conception of fair play and
substantial justice"3' and without undue inconvenience to either party:
[liMithout such an Act, an insurer could say to an insured, or to his beneficiary, in
case of a controversy respecting liability under a policy, that the issue between them
could be settled in only one of two ways, first, by accepting the insurer's contention
or, second, by suing the insurer in its own bailiwick.3'
other activities for the defendant that the corporation was easily held to be "doing business"
anyhow. New v. Robinson-Houchin Optical Co., 357 Pa. 47, 53 A. 2d 79 (1947). Without
apparent notice of the Shoe case, the court in McWhorter v. Anchor Serum Co., 72 F. Supp.
437 (Ark., 1947), followed the "mere solicitation" rule and dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction. In Deaton Truck Lines, Inc. v. Bahnson Co., 207 S.C. 226,36 S.E. 2d 465 (1945),
the court seemed to proceed under the impression that so long as the corporation's activities
were interstate commerce and not intrastate business, the corporation was not subject to
service of process in the state. But cf. State v. Ford Motor Co., 2o8 S.C. 379, 38 S.E. 2d 242
(1946). It was clearly established in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579
(1914), that interstate commerce alone might render a corporation subject to suit outside the
state of its organization.
2 aThe opinion of the Supreme Court in the International Shoe case does not directly over-
rule the "mere solicitation" rule; rather, it removes the foundation for the rule with the intro-
duction of the test of reasonableness and justice. If only the material facts and the decision in
the case are considered, without reference to the remainder of the opinion, the "mere solicita-
tion" rule clearly appears to be destroyed. Compare the similar handling of the situation in
Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., 165 F. 2d 33 (C.C.A. ad, 1948). It is interesting to note
that the Supreme Court, in the International Shoe case, did not use the phrase "doing business"
except in reciting the contentions of the appellant and the holding of the Washington court.
28 Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 896 (S.C., 1946).
29 S.C. Code of Laws (Supp., 1944) § 82o. The Act has been adopted in Arkansas,Louisiana,
and South Dakota, as well as South Carolina. 9 U.L.A. 198 (Supp., 1948). No other cases
concerning its validity seem to have appeared.
30 S.C. Code of Laws (Supp.,, 1944) §§ 802o-5.
31 Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 896, 898 (S.C., 1946). -- Ibid.
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The court declared that the state legislature had the right to define what acts
constitute doing business so long as its definition "was not arbitrarily unreason-
able,"33 and denied the defendant's motion to set aside service of process. Prob-
ably few would question the reasonableness or the justice of this decision. It is
therefore in accordance with the constitutional doctrines of International Shoe
Co. v. Washington.34
The distinction between continuous and systematic activities and single or
isolated acts by the foreign corporation's agents within the state is one of the
criteria supplementing the broad test of reasonableness in the International Shoe
opinion.tThe Court does not foreclose the possibility that isolated activity could
result in proper subjection of the corporation to suit so long as the cause of ac-
tion arose out of that activity,3s although the opinion recognizes something of a
presumption against such a possibility. Nevertheless, it would not be entirely
unreasonable to provide, for example, that courts of a particular state should
have jurisdiction over all disputes arising out of contracts made (or to be per-
formed) within the state, regardless of the number of contracts of the defendant
which were made (or to be performed) there.36 Moreover, the Court in the
International Shoe case implies that the test as to what activities will subject the
foreign corporation to suit is qualitative, not "simply mechanical or quantita-
tive."37
Perhaps the attitude of state courts in recent decisions may be illustrated by a
Pennsylvania case35 in which a steamship corporation was the defendant. Four
33 Ibid., at 9o0.
34 In Cindrich v. Indiana Travelers Assur. Co., 356 Mo. IO64, 204 S.W. 2d 765 (1947), a
similar caseinvolving a similar statute, the Missouri Supreme Court felt "constrained to rule"
that the statute did not apply to the transactions of the insurer "in view of" Minnesota Com-
mercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923). The court did not mention International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.
3s Indeed, it is implied that where the single or isolated acts are of a sort dangerous to life
or property, the corporation may be constitutionally subjected to suit on causes of acion aris-
ing out of such acts. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 32o, 318 (1945). This
is stated to be the law in Rest., Judgments § 28 (942). However, the proposition has in the
past met with difficulties in the courts. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 73, at 378-79 (1938).
36 In England, Order XI of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides for service out of
the jurisdiction whenever the "action is one brought against a defendant.., to enforce,
rescind, dissolve, annul or otherwise affect a contract or to recover damages or other relief
for or in respect of the breach of a contract-(i) made within the jurisdiction, or (ii) made by
or through an agent trading or residing within the jurisdiction on behalf of a principal trading
or residing out of the jurisdiction... or is one brought.. . in respect of a breach committed
within the jurisdiction of a contract wherever made.. . ." Annual Practice 96-7 (1947).
The power of English courts to permit service on an absent defendant under these rules is dis-
cretionary. The court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction if the resulting hardship upon the
defendant would be too great. Service out of the jurisdiction is, however, frequently allowed.
Annual Practice 108-14 (z947); Wolff, Private International Law 67-69 (1945); Cheshire,
Private International Law 111-15 (2938); cf. Ross v. Ostrander, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 706 (Sup. Ct.,
1948) (refusing recognition to English judgment against American promisor served in N.Y.).
37 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 3io, 329 (1945).
38 Holliday v. Pacific Atlantic S.S. Corp., 354 Pa. 271, 47 A. 2d 254 (1946).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
ships operated by the defendant came to Philadelphia in the year in which
process was served. When in the port, the ships were "turned around" by a local
concern which arranged for pilots, a berth for the ship, towboats, paying off the
crew, and signing a new crew. This concern acted for the defendant only when
its ships came to Philadelphia, performing no other services for the defendant.
The court thought that there was "not enough in the record to sustain... a
judgment in personam"39 against the corporation. The court apparently found
nothing to the contrary in its quotations from the International Shoe opinion.
Although the question of degree as to what are isolated acts and what are con-
tinuous activities must often be a matter of argument, in recent cases clearly in-
volving isolated acts the courts have not attempted to claim jurisdiction over
the nonresident defendant.40
Aside from the extent of te activities of the corporation within the forum,
the significant supplementary test announced by the Supreme Court in the
International Shoe case is whether or not the cause of action arose from those
activities.4' If the activities are only single or isolated acts and the cause of
action is unconnected with them, it is probably still unconstitutional to subject
the corporation to suit. However, if the corporate operations within the forum
are continuous and substantial, even though the cause of action did not arise
from those operations, the implication of the International Shoe opinion is that
it is not necessarily unconstitutional to require the corporation to defend the
39 1bid., at 275, 256. In Holland v. Parry Nay. Co., 7 F.R.D. 471 (Pa., 1947), on almost
precisely the same facts, the defendant was held to have been "doing business" in Pennsyl-
vania sufficient to make it amenable to service, although the defendant's motion to vacate
service was granted because the person served was not considered a proper party for service
under the Pennsylvania statute; cf. Oro Nay. Co. v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 2d 884,
187 P. 2d 444 (I947) (defendant's ship prepared for operation and crew hired in state).
40 The defendant's activities, arguably within the "isolated acts" class, were held not to
constitute "doing business" for jurisdictional purposes in Read v. La Salle Extension Uni-
versity, 156 F. 2d 575 (App. D.C., 1946) (solicitation of students on commission basis by one
entirely independent representative, paying own expenses); Yedwab v. M. A. Richards Corp.,
137 N.J.L. 448, 6o A. 2d 31o (1948) (advising dealer as to merchandise display); Harrub
v. Hy-Trous Corp., 31 So. 2d 567 (Ala., 1947) (visit by defendant's president to confer with
independent local distributor); Hellman v. Ladd, 315 Mich. 150, 23 N.W. 2d 244 (1946)
(advising and assisting supplier); Condon-Cunningham Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 64
F. Supp. 922 (Neb., 1946) (maintaining one representative to "create good will" and "enthuse
and advise distributors"); Geller v. Macon, D. & S. R. Co., i9o N.Y. Misc. 903, 75 N.Y.S.
2d 818 (1947) (negotiating bond refunding and occasional visits by agent to solicit freight
business). In the following cases, it also appeared that the cause of action was not one arising
out of the business done: Fehlhaber Pile Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 155 F. 2d 864
(App. D.C., 1946) (government-owned corporation maintaining Washington office for public
and intergovernmental relations purposes); Rogers v. Mountain States Royalties, Inc.,
116 Colo. 455, 182 P. 2d 142 (T947) (holding directors' meetings in state); Wolfer v. Lit
Bros., 35 N.J.L. 253, 51 A. 2d iS (i947) (lone agent soliciting by telephone from private
apartment); Central Motor Lines v. Brooks Transp. Co., 225 N.C. 733, 36 S.E. 2d 271 (I945)
(owning unused intrastate franchise and making occasional trips into state).
4' It should be noted that a cause of action may arisein State A and yet arise out of business
done in State B. The distinction here is not between causes of action arising in the state of the
forum and those arising elsewhere.
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action away from its "home."42 Apparently no court has yet found it desirable
to utilize this opportunity, for subsequent cases have uniformly dismissed such
actions.43 Perhaps this is because no case has appeared in which it would have
been clearly in accord with ordinary notions of "fair play and substantial jus-
tice" to assert jurisdiction over such an action.4" Cases can be imagined, how-
ever, in which it would be no hardship upon the corporation to defend an action
in a state in which it was doing business, even though the action had no relation
to that business.45 Defendants have been known to interpose jurisdictional ob-
jections without regard to the amount of hardship upon them, or upon the
plaintiff if those objections should prevail. In balancing the conflicting interests
of the parties with regard to the relative burden in assuming or rejecting juris-
diction, the weight may sometimes be on the plaintiff's side, regardless of the
origin of the cause of action. On the other hand, a possible party, though he may
be rare, is the plaintiff who seeks to recover a default judgment on the basis of
an unjust claim, small enough to be exceeded by the amount it would cost the
defendant to rebut the claim. Moreover, since it will probably most often be
unreasonable to force the corporation to defend an unrelated foreign cause of
42 This is contrary to what had previously been thought the law. Rest., Conflict of Laws
§92 ('934); 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 89.4 (1935); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 73, at 176-77
(1938). This earlier conclusion was based on Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass~n of Indianapolis v.
McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (I9O7), and Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115 (1914). No
opinion was expressed on the question in Rest., Judgments § 3o (1942). In Central Motor
Lines v. Brooks Transp. Co., 225 N.C. 733, 36 S.E. 2d 271 (1945), the court, after discussing
the International Shoe case, said: "We have not found the authority of the Wayne case and the
Simon case successfully distinguished, or disputed, upon the factual situations which they
present...." Ibid., at 276. But the supposed authority of those cases seems clearly limited by
standards presented by the International Shoe case. The Simon and Wayne cases have been
distinguished before. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 22o N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
43 Smith v. Hydro Gas Co. of West Florida, 157 F. 2d 8o9 (C.C.A. 5 th, 1946), cert. den.
330 U.S. 844 (1947); Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 152 F. 2d 142 (App. D.C.,
1945); Fehlhaber Pile Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 155 F. 2d 864 (App. D.C., 1946);
Landaasv. Canister Co., 69F. Supp. 835 (N.Y., 1946); Rogers v. Mountain StatesRoyalties, Inc.,
1i6 Colo. 455, 182 P. 2d 142 (1947); Central Motor Lines v. Brooks Transp. Co., 225 N.C.
733, 36 S.E. 2d 271 (1945); D. W. Onan & Sons v. Superior Court, 65 AriZ. 255, 179 P. 2d 243
(1947); Wolfer v. Lit Bros., 135 N.J.L. 253, 5i A. 2d 15 (1947). In some of these cases it was
simply held that the defendant was not "doing business" in the state, and whether the rele-
vance of the cause of action was considered does not appear.
44 However, in actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act prior to enactment of the
new judicial Code, if the defendant was found to be "doing business" in the district, it made
no difference where the cause of action arose, in view of the interpretation of the venue pro-
vision of that statute. Note 24 supra.
4s Such as an action to recover the amount due on a negotiable instrument on which the
foreign corporation is unquestionably the party primarily liable, the issue concerning only the
negotiation of the instrument to the plaintiff in the state of the forum or the construction of the
terms of the instrument in view of the formal requisites of negotiability. Generally, there will
be no substantial hardship on the defendant in cases where the corporation has no real
defense on the merits, where the facts are not in dispute and the issue is one of law, or where
the disputed facts may be determined from the testimony of witnesses readily available to the
forum.
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action, it might be well to refuse all such actions in the interests of certainty,
unless a definite type can be clearly set apart from the others.
Several foreign corporation jurisdiction cases involve, in effect, the question:
Who is doing business? The facts in Bach v. Friden Calculating MaCh. C0.46 will
serve as an illustration: An alleged agent of the defendant California corpora-
tion sold, serviced, and repaired the defendant's machines in Ohio. The de-
fendant contended that the alleged agent was an independent contractor. The
court studied the contract between the defendant and the "independent con-
tractor," which seemed to be formally prepared to appear like an agreement
with an independent contractor, but which revealed very extensive control by
the corporation over that party's business operations.47 Recognizing the "broad-
ened viewpoint" of the International Shoe case,/the court thought that, in ac-
cordance with the test of reasonableness and justice, "r[m]ere formalism should
give way to the real substance of the agreement .... ,,48 The lower court's deci-
sion for the defendant was therefore reversed. Other courts agree in similar
cases, 49 and there can be little question as to their correctness, for "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" do not allow the defendant to dis-
own its activities when they give rise to obligations. Of course, if the alleged
agent is actually independent, as in the ordinary wholesaler-retailer relation-
ship, the activities of the retailer cannot constitute "doing business" by the
wholesaler.o Who is "doing business" is largely a question of fact and, it would
46 167 F. 2d 679 (C.C.A. 6th, 1948).
47 The contract provided that the agent should not further the interest of any of the cor-
poration's competitors, or engage in any other general business without the corporation's
consent. The agent was required to sell at prices fixed by the corporation, to locate in a place
acceptable to the corporation, to operate under a name similar to the corporation's, and to
give the corporation free access to his files. The agent agreed to maintain liability insurance
on vehicles used in the business to an amount satisfactory to the corporation. The agent was
forbidden to mortgage any machine in his possession, or to become a surety or endorser without
the corporation's consent. The agent took orders in the name of the corporation, and his cus-
tomers remitted to the corporation. Ibid.
48 Ibid., at 683.
49 Harrison v. Corley, 226 N.C. 184, 37 S.E. 2d 489 (1946) (agent operating airports for
corporation under contract ostensibly a "lease"); Littman v. Morris B. Sachs, Inc., 65 N.Y.S.
2d 754 (Sup. Ct., 1946) (local corporation acting as buying agent for defendant); cf. Clover
Leaf Freight Lines v. Pacific Coast Wholesalers Ass'n, 66 F. 2d 626 (C.C.A. 7th, 1948), cert.
den. 69 S. Ct. 46 (1948) (freight forwarding agent). Each of the preceding cases expressly
followed the International Shoe case; the Clover Leaf case is a particularly well-reasoned
application of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. In Giusti v. Pyrotechnic
Industries, I56 F. 2d 351 (C.C.A. 9th, 1946), cert. den. sub nor. Triumph Explosives, Inc. v.
Giusti, 329 U.S. 787 (1946), an express consent case, the court held that the defendant's
unfair trade practices, although wrongful, nevertheless amounted to "business transacted"
in California for jurisdictional purposes. California firms which were members of the monopo-
listic conspiracy were held agents through which the "business" was transacted.
so The independence of the alleged agent was the decisive factor against jurisdiction in
Landaas v. Canister Co., 69 F. Supp. 835 (N.Y., 1946) (lone salesman paid own expenses);
Guile v. Sea Island Co., 66 N.Y.S. 2d 467 (Sup. Ct., 1946), aff'd without opinion 272 App. Div.
881, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 91i (1947), appeal dismissed 297 N.Y. 71, 77 N.E. 2d 793 (1948) (local
corporation soliciting guests for defendant's resort hotel); and influential in Read v. La Salle
NOTES
seem, not altogether dependent upon the law of agency.5S
Although the broad test of the International Shoe case has been expressly
adopted as controlling in many decision ,eAhe potentialities of those standards
are far from realized.53 A general review of subsequent cases reveals some courts
still speaking in terms of "implied consent"54 or "presence."Ss Probably the most
significant feature of the case was its removal of the problem from "that world
of abstraction-drawn from the analogy of arrest under a capias-in which it
has hitherto so helplessly floundered."s 6 The fictions no longer have any proper
place in the decisions. Their misleading and confusing influence should not be
perpetuated in dealing with a problem which has none but real aspects to the
parties involved and which can be measured by the plaintiffs and defendants in
terms of convenience, money costs, and injustice. Although extension of the
jurisdiction of courts may be expected to continue in the wake of scientific and
economic developments, the specific possibilities of extension discussed above
may not all develop in the near future, since they often involve situations in
which there may be considerable difference of opinion as to the reasonableness
of assuming jurisdiction over a particular defendant or class of defendants.
But there is surely no necessity for dealing in outworn abstractions when the
Supreme Court has stated the issue in terms of the considerations actually in-
volved. The broad standards of the International Shoe case may be expected to
prevail in a mature legal system.
Extension University, 156 F. 2d 575 (App. D.C., 1946). Cf. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
International Plastic Corp., 159 F. 2d 554 (C.C.A. 7th, 1947) (distributor's place of business
not defendant's "place of business" within patent infringement venue statute).
51 The artificiality of corporate personality is responsible for an analogous problem in the
case of the wholly-owned subsidiary corporation resident or doing business in the state and
the defendant parent corporation organized elsewhere. These facts alone were held insufficient
to give courts of the subsidiary's state jurisdiction over the parent in State v. Northwest
Magnesite Co., 28 Wash. 2d 1, 182 P. 2d 643 (1947), the court following Cannon Mfg. Co. v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925); cf. Schenstrom v. Continental Machines, Inc.,
7 F.R.D. 434 (N.Y., 1947) (foreign corporation and local partnership both wholly owned and
directed by one family; jurisdiction over partnership not jurisdiction over corporation although
partnership was exclusive selling outlet of corporation). But where the officers of both are the
same persons, and they manage the defendant from within the state, the opposite result-has
been reached. Pickthall v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 73 F. Supp. 694 (N.Y., 1947) ("doing
business" within F.E.L.A. venue provision); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 72
F. Supp. 1013 (N.Y., 1947) ("found" within district under Clayton Act).
s2 Cases cited notes 20, 22, 26, 28, 46, 49 supra; Grace v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 57 A. 2d
6xg (N.H., 1948); Winkler-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 7o F. Supp. 77
(N.Y., 1946).
s The International Shoe decision has received no mention at all in at least twenty sub-
sequent cases, although they involved situations to which its authority extends.
S4 See, for example, Central Motor Lines v. Brooks Transp. Co., 225 N.C. 733, 36 S.E. 2d
271 (I94S).
ss See, for example, Yedwab v. M. A. Richards Corp., 137 N.J.L. 448, 6o A. 2d 310 (1948);
Myers Motors, Inc. v. Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp., 8o F. Supp. i8 (Minn., 1948); Schenstrom v.
Continental Machines, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 434 (N.Y., 1947).
s6 L. Hand, J., in Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., i65 F. 2d 33, 37 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948).
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II
Anything said about jurisdiction over individuals or partnerships in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington is necessarily dictum. However, the discussion
of jurisdiction over foreign corporations in the opinion was introduced by refer-
ence to jurisdiction over individuals:
[N]ow that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of sum-
mons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."S7
There seems no reason that a continuous course of business conducted by the
agents of a nonresident individual should not be considered the equivalent of
such "minimum contacts." The nonresident businessman may profit just as
much from dealing with the state's citizens as a foreign corporation. The hard-
ship is just as great if one of those citizens meets with jurisdictional objections
when he seeks, in the courts of his state, to assert a claim arising out of the
business done by the nonresident within the state.51 "Traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice" surely require that the nonresident doing business
in the state be compelled to defend, in the courts of the state, causes of action
arising out of the business done there. The International Shoe opinion suggests
that the jurisdictional theories pertaining to corporations and those relating to
individuals have at last coalesced.59 The case of Flexner v. Farson,10 which was
once thought to block the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresident individuals
not present within the state, has long since been distinguished. 6' The fact that a
state does not have the power to exclude a nonresident individual is of no conse-
quence, for the power of a state to exclude a corporation from intrastate busi-
ness no longer has any bearing on jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in the
absence of express consent, the doctrine of "implied consent" being dead. It
may be concluded that it is entirely reasonable to expect that a statute, provid-
ing for proper service of process on nonresident individuals whose agents do
business within the state and for jurisdiction over the nonresidents with respect
to causes of action arising out of those activities, would today be found constitu-
tional.6
s7 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 3io, 316 (1945).
s8 Indeed, many foreign corporations may be forced to expressly consent to the jurisdic-
tion of the state's courts before they do business in the state, while this condition cannot be
imposed on individuals. Thus, if jurisdiction depended entirely upon express consent, one
dealing with nonresident individuals would more often be forced to take his claims to another
state than one dealing with foreign corporations.
59 See note 35 supra for another aspect of the suggested joinder.
60 248 U.S. 289 (i919).
61 Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business within the State, 32 Harv. L.
Rev. 871, 890 (IM19).
6 This position was taken in Rest., Judgments § 22 (1942), largely on the basis of the
Supreme Court's holding in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (i935). How-
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Such was the holding of the Arkansas Supreme Court in a recent case.63 The
court recognized the relevance of the International Shoe decision to the question
before it,64 and held that the statute s did not violate any constitutional right of
the nonresident defendant:
It does not violate the due process clause since it requires a legal basis for juris-
diction, that is the nonresident, defendant, must have done some business, work or
service within the State. It does no violence to the privileges and immunities clause
because it does not discriminate between non-residents but places them upon the
same basis as residents.66
Similar statutes are in force in other states, 67 and foreign corporation cases are
often looked to in determining what activities constitute "doing business" by
the individual.6 8 The International Shoe case may therefore become a significant
ever, the Court in that decision had expressly limited itself to the particular facts of the situa-
tion there presented. Ibid., at 628. The Court carefully noted the fact that the defendant's
business, that of dealing in corporate securities, was subjected to special regulation by the
state. It was thus suggested that the case might be only a slight extension of the principle of
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), that a nonresident's acts which are of a sort dangerous
to life or property may provide the basis for jurisdiction as to causes of action arising out of
such acts. "Both the sale of securities and the operation of motor vehicles are fraught with
danger and economic harm to the general public." Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 7o, at x68
(1938). The idea originating from the nonresident motorist cases was carried a little further in
Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F. 2d 740 (C.C.A. 5th, [944), where the application of a Mississippi
statute (Miss. Code Ann. [1944] § 1437) was held constitutional. The statute provided for
jurisdiction over nonresident individuals doing business in the state without discriminating
between types of business. However, the defendant's Mississippi business was the construc-
tion of a levee, and the court, emphasizing the hazardous nature of construction work and
relying on the nonresident motorist cases, was careful to limit itself to the facts at hand. The
court thought the statute, as there applied, was a reasonable exercise of the police power of the
state. Compare Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938) (nonresident owner or user
of local real estate).
63 Gillioz v. Kincannon, 214 S.W. 2d 212 (Ark., 1948). Accord: Wein v. Crockett, 195 P. 2d
222 (Utah, 1948); Ritholz v. Dodge, 21o Ark. 404, 196 S.W. 2d 479 (1946); see Interchemical
Corporation v. Mirabelli, 269 App. Div. 224, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 522 (i945). In the Wein case, the
court observed: "If the cause of action arises in this state, out of business transacted in this
state, the probabilities are that the witnesses willbe readily available here; the law of this state
will control and determine the cause of action; and the courts here would be the forums of
convenience for the trial of the action. To require a resident who is transacting business in
this locality to commence his action in a foreign jurisdiction on a cause of action arising here,
and transport his witnesses to other states would make protection of his right prohibitive and
would, in effect, permit nonresidents to continue in business in this state immune from legal
responsibility." Wein v. Crockett, supra, at 228-29.
64 Gillioz v. Kincannon, 214 S.W. 2d 212, 215 (Ark., 1948). The Arkansas court relied on
the language in the International Shoe decision quoted in text at note 57 supra.
's Ark. Acts (i947) No. 347.
66 Gillioz v. Kincannon, 214 S.W. 2d 212, 216 (Ark., 1948).
67 See, e.g., Ky. Codes Ann. (Carroll, 1948), Civ. Prac. Code §§ 51-56; N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Ann. (Cahill, 1946) § 229-b; Utah L. (1947) c. xo.
68 As in Melvin Pine & Co. v. McConnell, 298 N.Y. 27, 8o N.E. 2d 137 (1948); Kaffenberger
v. Kremer, 63 F. Supp. 924 (Pa., 1945); Debrey v. Hanna, 182 N.Y. Misc. 824, 45 N.Y.S. 2d
55'A'(1943).
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precedent on this question. This was forcefully recognized in a case in one of the
lower New York courts,6 9 in which the defendant partners' motion to dismiss
was at first granted. This decision was recalled and the motion denied on reargu-
ment, after the court had "been advised of the latest pronouncement of the
United States Supreme Court [the International Shoe case] upon the subject of
what activities of a non-resident within a state will subject such non-resident to
jurisdiction."70 On appeal, the lower court's decision was affirmed on the basis of
the "long-recognized test of what constitutes engaging in business. .... ,"7' How-
ever, the Court of Appeals, for unstated reasons, said:
It is unnecessary, at this time, to say whether and to what extent that test may
be relaxed in reliance upon the constitutional principles recently announced by the
Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. . . .7
The cautious reluctance of the New York court eems unnecessary. Even though
the principles of the International Shoe case would not necessarily result in a
relaxation of the "test" mentioned, those principles might reasonably be relied
upon in actions against nonresident individuals engaging in business within the
state.
It has generally been conceded that, in states in which partnerships and
unincorporated associations are subject to suit as entities, nonresident organiza-
tions of this nature may be treated jurisdictionally in the same manner as
undomesticated foreign corporations. That is, a nonresident partnership doing
business in such a state is subject to suit there in causes of action arising out of
the business done in the state. 73 This jurisdiction was not thought to apply to
the partners as individuals.74 A statute providing for jurisdiction over the non-
resident partners individually would appear to be valid today, in view of the
principles discussed above with regard to individuals. Again, the standards of
the International Shoe case as to the extent of activities within the forum which
is necessary for jurisdiction should be influential in partnership cases.
The implications here drawn from International Shoe Co. v. Washington take
on added significance when it is realized that they are part of a dual trend in
jurisdictional decisions: in defining the court with jurisdiction, a trend from the
court with immediate power over the defendant to the court where both parties
may most conveniently settle their dispute; and in defining due process of law, a
trend from emphasis on the territorial limitations of courts to emphasis on pro-
viding notice and an opportunity to be heard. The International Shoe case may
thus be expected to continue to gain in importance.
69 Melvin Pine & Co. v. McConnell, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 814 (Sup. Ct., 1946), aff'd 273 App. Div.
128, 76 N.Y.S. 2d 279 (1948).
7o Ibid., at 814-15.
7 Melvin Pine & Co. v. McConnell, 298 N.Y. 27, 8o N.E. 2d 137 (1948).
72 Ibid. (Italics added).
73 Rest., Conflict of Laws § 86 (i934); 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 86.i (1935).
74 Western Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 42 F. Supp. 1007 (Iowa, 1941);
i Beale, Conflict of Laws § 86.1 (1935).
